What Burma Teaches Us About the Killings

Recently, I read “Hit or Miss? The Effect of Assassinations on Institutions and War” by Benjamin F. Jones and Benjamin A. Olken (2009). The paper’s main point is that when assassination succeed against autocratic leaders, countries are more likely to move toward democracy. And assassinations tend to intensify conflict. The study compares successful and failed serious attempts, treats success or failures as almost random once an attempt occurs, and focus on national leaders from 1875 to 2004 using standard political datasets.

However, the study doesn’t focus on places where monarchical legitimacy holds politics together. Parts of Southeast Asia look like this. Power often rests on a balance among royal families, elite networks, palace offices, the military, and religious symbols. Removing one person can topple the balance.

Myanmar after the British colonization is a good example. Aung San, who was assassinated in 1947, and the founder who brokered Burma’s post-colonial deal in the Panglong Agreement, a crucial accord between Burmese leaders and ethnic groups that aimed to establish a federal union in Myanmar, promoting self-determination and unity among diverse nationalities after British rule. Losing a founder who united the nation, under U Nu, the first prime minister, struggled to manage both the army and ethnic conflicts.

Later, after Ne Win’s coup, Sao Kya Seng, a Shan prince and national parliamentarian, disappeared in 1962 (some said he was taken life under the detention of the Ne Win secret service). He was a link between the union and a princely state. Removing him did not strike the national executive. It cut the bridge between center and periphery. In a fragmented country, this kind of loss increases insurgency risk and invites stronger coercion from the center, with little prospect of democratization.

Put together, Burma shows a pathway the original study does not model. Where royal authority shapes politics, assassination can creates a legitimacy shock, not just a leadership vacancy. Militaries and other “guardian” bodies can absorb that shock and gain power. The likely direction is still undecided? But one thing for sure of this nation is not a moving toward democracy.

Additional points for the research:

• Who gets targeted matters, not only national heads of state. Founders and loyal bloodline can be pivotal because they broker center-periphery deals.
• Where power comes from. If rule relies on sacred symbols and dynastic continuity, removing one person does not dissolve the regime’s core. It shifts power to guardians who claim to protect the throne or the nation (this also happens with Thailand’s case).
• How conflict is structured also matters. In the ethnically segmented states, killing a broker raises insurgency risk and fragments the opposition, making the state unlikely to move toward democratic regime.